

Structuralism in the Wilderness: Barthes and Ferdinand De Saussure

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(Accepted 9/11/2003)

□ ABSTRACT □

The research work deals with the approaches of Barthes and Saussure to literature. Barthes and Saussure view literature as "self-contained autonomous body", consisting of a set of syntactical and linguistic components, such as the phonemes, morphemes, allophones, morphs, hyponyms and antonyms.

Other considerations, as components of literature, such as author, the historical context of the text, the various social, religious or cultural truths implicit in the text, are all to be ignored. This is because literature is an autonomous body, independent of any other factors alien to its linguistic nature: the writer accordingly, has no role to play or anything to do in the text except assembling or redeploying a set of already existing linguistic and cultural structures into a unified whole .

The work highlights those views of Barthes and Saussure which dehumanize literature, and claim the death of the author, pointing out the dangers of breaking up the text's "logocentrism". It also questions their concepts about stretching the text's interpretive limits endlessly and the ability of the reader to assimilate the infinite processes of the interpretations. The work, however, concludes that the practice of literary criticism cannot be said to be, according to a Barthean or Saussurean formula, "iconoclastic", or "monolithic", but rather it should be concrete, "because it is the concentration of many determinations", the least of which can never be ignored.

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النبوية في الخواء: بارت وفرديناوند دوسوسور

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(قبل للنشر في 2003/11/9)

□ الملخص □

يعالج البحث مفهوم سوسور وبارت اللغوي في تحليل الأدب ودراسته نقدياً. ينظر بارت وسوسور إلى الأدب بوصفه هيئة مستقلة ذاتياً قائمة بحد ذاتها، قوامها اللغة بمكوناتها الأساسية المعروفة النحوية والصرفية، بما في ذلك الحروف، والكلمات، والمقاطع الصوتية، وعلامات الاسم، والصفة، والفعل، فضلاً عن البنى المختلفة التي تشكل الجمل الاسمية والفعلية، والشرطية، وأشباه الجمل .

ويختلف دوسوسور مع بارت حول مفهوم الدال والمدلول (signifier/signified)، حيث يعتقد دوسوسور بأن الدال والمدلول يشكلان وحدة إشارتية متكاملة، بينما يعتقد بارت بأن الدال ينزلق باستمرار تحت المدلول، لأنّ "النص الأدبي يشكل كوكبة من مجموعات الدال، وليس نظاماً يقوم على مجموعات المدلول".

وبالتالي فإنّ قراءة النص الأدبي يجب أن تتم بمعزل عن الكاتب، أو البيئة الاجتماعية التي كتب فيها النص، أو السيرة الذاتية للمؤلف، أو أي سياق تاريخي آخر. يبرر سوسور وبارت مقولتهما تلك بالقول بأنّ النص الأدبي هو مجرد وحدة لغوية متكاملة لا يسهم المؤلف فيها بشيء سوى إعادة ترتيب وتصنيف للإشارات اللغوية والأفكار الثقافية من جديد.

من خلال هذا الطرح يجرد سوسور وبارت الأدب من وظيفته الإنسانية وأبعاده الأخلاقية، وخاصة بطرحهما نظرية "موت الكاتب"، وتجاهلهما علاقة النص الأدبي بالواقع المعاشي الاجتماعي للناس، وصلة المؤلف الوثيقة بهذا النص، وتركيزهما على الجانب اللغوي وحسب.

ينتهي البحث إلى إبراز عيوب النبوية ونواقصها، وتسليط الضوء على الأفكار المجردة الغامضة فيها، تلك الأفكار التي تؤدي بالنص الأدبي والقارئ إلى طريق مسدود؛ كما يقدم البحث أفكاراً بديلة تبرز دور الأدب في حياة الشعوب وتاريخها الفكري والثقافي، ودور الأديب الإبداعي، وعلاقته بالنص الأدبي، ومساهمته في إغناء ثقافة البشر وحضارتهم الإنسانية.

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Linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as 'I' is nothing other than the instance saying "I": language knows a "subject", not a "person", and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it.¹

The central idea in the above passage revolves about the author who is stripped of all metaphysical status to the extent of becoming a location where language properties, including echoes, references etc., combine and contend. He echoes Roman Jakobson's contention that language is the mould by which messages in literature are usually produced, particularly Jakobson's idea about the poetic as "a set to the message" to be conveyed in the poem.² This is in spite of the fact that Barthes stresses the process of signification which produces the meaning and not this meaning itself.³

Barthes' concentration on language of the text as an inexhaustible source of signification, regardless of the author, creates in my view, a dilemma, not less troublesome and problematic than the Platonic dilemma. Plato brings literature to a deadlock when he declares that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the heroes, and that "the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them."⁴ Accordingly, Plato doesn't assign a great significance to poetry. For him, poetry as the only vehicle by which the artist had to express Man's deeper sentiments, had to be relegated to a dark footnote in history. Hence, poetry, or literature, in the broader sense of the word, was held to be valueless, and had no true function.

Plato strikes a note of rebellion for the structuralists who found out that literary discourse, in Raman Selden's terms, "has no truth function."⁵ This contention arose from structuralists' belief that "the text" is a self-contained autonomous body open to all types of interpretation on the part of the individual reader. Language, on the other hand, is the source from which literary meanings may be derived. The author usually draws on the accumulated heap of language and culture bringing into light nothing new. He makes use of writing technique which depend on redeployment, or assembling tactics to formulate his ideas "which are always written."⁶ Barthes puts his critical confidence in the presupposed fact that "language ceaselessly calls into question all origins" of meaning. In my view the fact he refers to above fails him, because it is ultimately illogical or at least insufficiently convincing to claim that the author and the meaning have nothing to do with the producer. Structuralists argue that to give a text an author is to impose a limit on the text, to finish it with a final signified, to close the writing.⁷

Hence, the literary text (or in Barthes' terms "writing")⁸ is not more than a formula, the constituents of which are cultural codes accumulated down the ages, and that the author is no more than a decipherer of those codes who brings together the deciphered parts into a unified whole. He is a passive decoder whose synthetic potency is confined to his intellectual potentials by putting together the already existing parts. Systems of expression or meaning extend, according to Barthes, to all other human practices: kinship, haute cuisine, totems, narrative discourse, rites, rituals, or myths. Each form of human practices has its own system or pattern of expression which marks its distinction from other social practices. In this case, the inventor of the code has

nothing to do with it, since the whole social practice is referred back to already existing models always ready to draw upon. In other words, a general social practice is an amalgamation of individual social practices of the constituent members of a particular community. These practices represent what Barthes calls “sign systems” operating on the model of language.

The model of language gains grounds at the hands of Saussure, who contends that the universal human phenomenon of language of which narrative discourse is made up, is no more than “a system of signs.”⁹ He refutes the previous contention that language is “a word heap” of “symbols.”¹⁰ Such a clash between views relating to linguistic criticism, as it came to be known later, and those relating to the traditional view of language, a view initiated since time immemorial, brings us to the dilemma of structuralism, on which Leonard Jackson rightly comments:

Saussure attempted to provide a scientific basis for the study of language – and, more generally, of signs... This strategy had a fundamental flaw, which arose from what I have called ‘the logical’ poverty of the underlying model of language – its inadequacy to account even for the facts of language, let alone those of literature or society.¹¹

Saussure’s argument that language is “a system of differences”, or a system of signs which acquire their current status through social interaction, triggers the structuralist controversy. His division of the linguistic sign into “a signifier”, and “a signified”, that is into a spoken or written sign and a concept, strikes a note of revolution in linguistics. Structuralists who came after Saussure, like Roman Jakobson, David Lodge, Roland Barthes, Jonathan Culler, and Claude-Levi-Strauss, carry the structuralist controversy miles forward complicating the linguistic issue more and more. Richard Dutton in his **An Introduction to Literary Criticism** sums up the structuralist dilemma by confirming that “structuralism is concerned with theoretical attempts to explain and define itself, at the expense of such items as the literary texts it offers to explicate.” This suspicion is only reinforced by the existence of a variety of critical approaches, such as formalism, phenomenology and deconstruction.¹²

There is no doubt that structuralism represented a major challenge to new critical practices propounded by Leavis, Eliot and Hoggart. They all have assigned a remarkable position to language, as the inexhaustible source of human knowledge and understanding. Language has been seen in two ways: either as a reflection of the actual world which the author depicts, or as a reflection of the author’s intellectual tendencies. In essence, language is part and parcel of the author’s personality. However, the Saussurean perspective posits the new challenge to the classical critical assumptions by alluding to the pre-existence of language. Thus, the word is given precedence over the text and not vice versa. Instead of confirming that language of the text reflects reality, Saussure contends that structures underlying the text represent the presupposed reality. Hence, structuralists tend to “demystify”, and “dehumanize” literature, by depriving it of its human aspects.¹³

The question which posits itself at this stage summarizes the whole structuralist dilemma: if literature is already linguistically oriented, what is the point of using linguistic models to decode its syntactical and grammatical components? What is the use of exerting such a massive effort in extracting the lowest-level elements of language in a literary text, including phonemes, morphemes, allophones, morphs,

hyponyms, and homonyms ... etc.? Would the discovery of these elements lead to true representation of reality? The answers to these questions may reach at a certain conclusion which appear to be, at the first glance, convincing. We may suggest that the discovery of the lowest-level elements of language, and the use of linguistic models may lead to a relative representation of reality. But soon after this, fragility and temporariness of the argument comes to surface: the Saussurian models for analysis and dissection of a literary text call implicitly for the death of the author, as he is no longer the source of literary meaning. Moreover, language becomes one of the sign-systems used by people to communicate with each other, other systems of communication being, as C.S. Pierce contends, the indexical, the symbolic, and the iconic.¹⁴ Hence comes the birth of semiotics, that sign system which represents human, social, cultural and linguistic practices.

Furthermore, Barthes develops Saussure's strategies for analysis of literature and human communicative practices. He sees in the sign-system which Saussure identifies as "a system of differences" a reliable ground upon which other "sign systems" of human communicative practices may be built. He applies this understanding to the lowest-level elements which constitute sound-system including phonemes, morphemes, words, and sentence formations. Sounds like "p", "s", "b", "m", "n", "h", etc., may be pronounced in a greatly different range of ways: the phonemes "m" and "n" may be read differently in words like "government" (gʌvnmnt), "mouth" (maʊθ), and "nose" (nʌz). Moreover, the "p" sound in "paper" is evidently different from "p" sound in "speak." Even if we say "speak", we would probably hear it as "speak". The example cited by Barthes himself in his *S/Z* is the liveliest example on the Barthian analyses in this concern. Barthes takes Balzac's *Sarrasine* as an example to illustrate in depth his structuralist theory. He differentiates between the two sibilants in the word "Sarrasine", as voiced 'z' and unvoiced 's'. He concludes that the social human phenomenon of language is covertly built upon a binary system of paired opposites which underlie all human linguistic practices. At the level of phonemes, these categories fall into four groups, namely, nasalised/non-nasalised, vocalic/non-vocalic, voiced/unvoiced, and tense/lax.¹⁵

Barthes applies his approach to virtually all social practices including rites, rituals, garments ...etc. He finds in those practices structures similar to language structures, which Saussure classifies as two dimensions of language, 'langue' and 'parole.'¹⁶ Barthes makes a similar division of other human systems of meaning other than language on the basis of two levels. He uses 'system', which is similar to 'langue', and 'syntagm', which is similar to 'parole' or 'speech.'¹⁷

What is paradoxical about Saussure's and Barthes' critical assumptions is that they try to fit literature into hard moulds. I believe that they fail in their endeavor, because the moulds are too tight for their proposal. Saussure discovers a presupposed set of syntactical rules underlying the human phenomenon of language hoping to neutralize the author who has nothing to contribute to the already existing structures of meaning. He unwittingly paves the way for post-structuralists. In his **Contemporary Literary theory** Raman Selden describes the critical assumptions of both Saussure and Barthes as follows: "They are structuralists who suddenly see the error of their ways."¹⁸

Barthes' involvement in the process of 'demystification' of human social practices is no less mysterious than Saussure's assumptions in this concern. In his attempt to solve the Saussurean dilemma, which considers language as a sign system of differences, Barthes complicates things more when he tries to press the linguistic rules

into moulds of literature. In his *S/Z* he argues: “the more indeterminate the origin of the statement, the more plural the text.”¹⁹ Barthes reverses the traditional viewpoint which had presupposed that plurality of the text is determinate and inclusive of the author’s intuitions as the origin and source of meaning in literary texts. Structuralists argued earlier that “paroles” are the products of personal systems (langues). It is an argument which suggests that the author’s role in deciding the meaning and structures of his literary works seems to be virtually insignificant. What is new in Barthes is that he gives utter freedom and pleasure to the reader to discover all those underlying systems within the text. He leaves doors of the signifying process open to the reader. They are always ready for modification and formulation without respect for the signified.

Barthes’ ambiguity lies in his metaphysical assumptions which presuppose that the signifier always slides under the signified, breaking up its repressive insistence on one meaning. He claims: “the text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds;”²⁰ he wants to strip the author from all potentialities of participation in formulating its system of meanings. He wishes the reader to do the task without respect to the author. By doing so, the reader is likely to be lost in the wasteland of signification that has no “beginning, as the codes it mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach.”²¹ He classifies such codes into five ones, namely, the ‘hermeneutic’, the ‘semic’, the ‘symbolic’, the ‘proairetic’, and the ‘cultural.’ This division that marks the climax of Barthes’ theorizing in the science of semiology was applied to Balzac’s short novella *Sarrasine*. The process of decoding the novella was held to be a great success for Barthes. He could unfold the layers of the unconscious on the part of the reader, by allowing “polarities and antitheses which allow multivalence and ‘reversibility.’”²²

Such a success carries the seeds of its failure, because the challenging question is: how far can the text assimilate the reader’s imposed infinite processes of interpretation? And if we continue to stretch the text’s interpretive limits endlessly, would the presupposedly elastic ends of the text resist stretching limitlessly, without getting into the danger of breaking up the text’s ‘logocentrism’? ²³ Barthes’ postulation concerning the codes to be used in the process of interpretation seem to contrast with the Derridean critical assumption which gives precedence to the spoken word over the written word. He justifies his assumption by suggesting that the latter is always subject to contamination and distortion by the readers’ invalid reinterpretations down the ages, while the former gains its validity through its direct influence on the receiver.

The Saussurean assumptions at this level seem to be less vulnerable to criticism than the Barthean postulations. Saussure speaks of the unified sign which has a natural tendency of forming and preserving a certain identity of signification, while Barthes speaks of an unstable process of signification: the unified sign of which Saussure speaks. It is the one with two faces similar to those of a coin. It becomes, in Barthes’ view, a unit of two moving layers always subject to modification.²⁴

There is no doubt, therefore, that structuralism represents, in Selden’s terms, “a major challenge to the dominant, Leavisite, and generally humanist types of critical practice.”²⁵ Barthes gets himself more involved in abstract theorizing, as his linguistic model is extended further to include ‘sign systems’ other than language: all social practices become a target for his linguistic analyses. He finds in garments a particular language similar to a sentence structure. Similarly, he finds in sports, for instance, a language different in its syntactical structure from the language used to describe ‘culinary’ items, or the language implied in the ladies’ dressing fashions. Each of these social practices constructs its synchronic and even, relatively speaking, its diachronic

linguistic features in a mode different from the other. The language implied in dressing fashions, sports, foodstuffs and other social practices might form a unique style at a particular time in history. At a later stage these social practices might change creating new ways and methods of social expression. Consequently, according to Barthes, the language implied in these fashions and practices will change carrying with it the new syntactic structures peculiar to them. The same process may be repeated at different times down history constructing its diachronic linguistic features.

The mode which distinguishes one social practice from the other is grammatically equivalent to a particular sentence to be uttered in the same context. Barthes gives an example about ladies' dressing fashions, such as a 'toque', a 'bonnet', and a 'hood', for instance, which may be worn on the same part of the body at the same time. He points out that any displacement of any item would result in a corresponding change in meaning. As such, the elements usually fit together to evoke a particular unit of meaning, or to create a particular kind of style. The same story applies to other social practices stated above. This grouping of garment items forms, for Barthes, the system of this type of language. But 'syntagm', the linguistic synonym for Saussure's concept of 'parole', may be formulated from other garments' 'ensemblesa.' In this case one item may be replaced by the other: a 'skirt', a 'blouse', and a 'jacket' constitute one set of pieces replaceable one by the other. The first example stands for 'langue, ' the language underpinning system of pre-given structures, while the second example represents 'parole, ' individual speech utterances, to which Chomsky refers as "competence" and "performance." In Barthean terminology, the former represents "system" or language underlying structures, while the latter represents 'syntagm' or "the speaker's use of language."²⁶ Barthes' contention above is clearly antihumanistic, because it strips the human subject of all the devices which it is likely to use in formulating the literary meaning. Barthes powerfully holds that writers are helpless to express themselves, or to create new writings away from "the already written." Their powers are limited to that extent which allows them to reassemble or redeploy the already existing writings:

The code is perspective of quotations, a mirage of structures ... They are so many fragments of some thing that has always been read, seen, done, experienced; the code is the work of that already. Referring to what has been written, it makes the text into a prospectus of this book²⁷

Other post-structuralists, such as Roman Jakobson, speak of metaphor and metonymy. In this concern he comes closer to Saussure's interpretive critical strategies, rather than to those of Barthes. He starts by pointing out the principal difference between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of language. It is a distinction made on the example of the Saussurean division of language into 'langue' and 'parole.' Jakobson's remodeling of the Saussurean strategies in analyzing literature results from the general tendency prevailing among critics at that time. It is a tendency, in Selden's terms, ready to "deflate the scientific pretensions of structuralism".²⁸

Jakobson's later works on poetry confirm that the concentration on studying the lowest-level elements of language including phonemes, morphemes, words, and sentences may lead to reverse results. This postulation enhances the doubts about the invalidity of Barthes' argument, which gives precedence to the analysis of the underpinning syntactic structures of sentences on the aesthetic function of the literary text. Thus, such cultural forms as poetry and literature may lose their truth function and even their aesthetic function.²⁹ Saussure surveys the history of linguistics and concludes

that it had failed to study language on a scientific basis, simply because it had “never attempted to determine the nature of its object.”³⁰ To explain a literary text in this way, in Pierre Macherey’s view point, is to deny its real complexity³¹ by changing it into another form of the already existing structure: “The result is a form of Platonic idealism in which the text is represented as a mere shadow cast by an ideal essence, a variant manifestation of some essential structure which is said to be visible through it.”³²

Another instance may be given here on Saussure’s and Barthes’ critical inadequacies and failure, particularly “the former’s inadequacy relating to the division which he makes between the synchronic study of ‘la langue’ and the diachronic study of the forces regulating ‘la langue.’”³³ Saussure drives a methodological wedge between the synchronic and the diachronic levels of analysis to separate between the analogous underpinning levels of language, namely, ‘langue’ and ‘parole’. But this division between the synchronic and the diachronic levels of analysis, though it addresses the systemic nature of language, it provides neither a means to describe the system of rules comprising ‘langue’, nor a methodology to interpret the process of the historical change: Bennett rightly observes:

Language hobbles on from one synchronic system of ‘la langue’ to another without any adequate account being offered as to how it does so or as to why, at a particular point of time, the particular system of rules which comprises ‘la langue’, takes the form that they do.”³⁴

Barthes’ complication of the process of signification to include all social practices makes him more vulnerable to criticism. His reference to ‘sign systems’ comprising a wide range of human practices without offering a satisfactory account of the means by which the systems work, makes us conclude that his assumptions are fanciful.

The literary text, then, cannot be taken to be a self-contained autonomous body, which is separable from the author’s intentions. The text always works according to various determinations, none of which can be claimed to be authoritatively the final one. All the particulars which go into the making of a text including the uses to which it is put, the annotations which are attached to it, the biographical sketch of the author, the historical context of the work, and even the design of the cover, must be placed under critical analysis and investigation. When structuralists center their attention on one component of the text, ignoring other constituents which go substantially into the making of the text, they “challenge some of the most cherished beliefs of the ordinary reader.”³⁵ The ordinary reader, even the educated or specialist reader, may lose interest in a text, when he/she will be asked to use ‘a reader guide’ to understand the underlying structures of a particular text. Even if he finds some interest in looking for the details of particulars of which the text is composed, he will find himself under obligation to look for other components of the text, whether they are thematic, structural, motivational, dominant, or biographical. If he did not do so, as a specialist, he would do so unconsciously, as an amateur who would inevitably find pleasure in reading a text if it had the potentials to open up new hopes for him. It follows then that the practice of literary criticism cannot be said to be, according to a Barthean or a Saussurean formula, ‘iconoclastic’, or ‘monolithic.’ The reader is thus free to enter the text from any direction relating to its culture regardless of the importance of one method of analysis over the other. What is concrete in the text remains the center of the text, “because it is the concentration of many determinations” the least of which can never be ignored.³⁶

Notes:

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1. Raman Selden, ed. 1988. **The Theory of Criticism**. London: Longman, p. 318.
2. Selden, **The Theory**, pp. 367-369.
3. Selden, **The Theory**, pp. 319-320.
4. David Daiches. 1956. **Critical Approaches to Literature**. London: Longman, p. 13.
5. Raman Selden, ed. 1989. **Contemporary Literary Theory**. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, p. 51.
6. Selden, **The Theory**, p. 319.
7. Selden, **The Theory**, 320.
8. Selden, **The Theory**, 319.
9. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 52.
10. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 52; and see Daiches' **Critical Approaches**, especially pp. 159, 229, for further discussion on the view relating to language.
11. Leonard Jackson. 1991. **The Poverty of Structuralism**. London: Longman, pp. 3, X.
12. Richard Dutton. 1984. **An Introduction to Literary Criticism**. London: Longman, p. 77.
13. For further discussion of this point see **Twentieth Century Literary theory** (ed. K. M. Newton). London: Macmillan, 1988, especially Roland Barthes' "Science Versus Literature", pp. 140-144; and also see Gerard Genette's "structuralism and Literary Criticism", especially pp. 135-140.
14. Newton, pp. 171, 181. Pierce divides 'sign system' into three categories noted above, making a useful distinction: the 'iconic' means to him a concordance between the sign and its referent (a road-sign for traffic in general); the indexical 'sign-system' means that the sign and its referent are associated together only causally, for example a cloud denoting rain, or smoke denoting fire; and finally the symbolic system represents "the arbitrary, primordial and instinctive" relationship, as David Lodge contends, which relates the sign to its referent, or gives the unconscious Freudian mind its status. P. 15.
15. David Lodge, ed. 1988. **Modern Literary Theory**. London: Longman, pp. 1, 79; and also see Roger Fowler. 1986. **Linguistic Criticism**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp34-35, 38.
16. See Douglas Tallack's **Literary Theory at Work**. London: B. T. Batsford, 1972, especially pp. 145-148, for further information on this idea.
17. Lodge, **Modern Literary Criticism**, pp. 10-14.
18. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 70.
19. Roland Barthes. 1875. **S/Z**; trans. Richard Miller. London: Cape, p. 41.
20. Selden, **The Theory**, p. 300.
21. Selden, **The Theory**, p. 300.
22. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 81.
23. Selden, **The Theory**, p. 386. Derrida in his **Of Grammatology** 1967, refers to the concept of (logos), the Greek term for 'word'; he claims in the book that the

- spoken word always implies an immediate presence, a center, logocentrism, while the written word, as it is repeated, printed and reprinted, interpreted and reinterpreted, it may lose such a center, leaving the text in an utter maze of confusion, impurity, and uncertainty.
24. For further discussion of this point, see Roland Barthes' **The Pleasure of the Text**. Trans. R. Miller (Hill and Wang, New York, 1975); and see also Saussure's **Course in General Linguistics**. Trans. W. Baskin (London: Longman, 1974), especially chap. I.
 25. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 66.
 26. For further details about Chomsky's concept of 'competence' and 'performance', see Neil Smith and Deidre Wilson's **Modern Linguistics**: London, Penguin Books, especially pp. 44-49.
 27. Selden, **The theory** pp. 301-302.
 28. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 70.
 29. Selden, **Contemporary Literary Theory**, p. 51.
 30. Quoted in Tony Bennett's **Formalism and Marxism**. 1979. London: Methuen Press, p. 46.
 - 31-32 . Bennett, p. 71; for further information about Macherey's views, see his **A Theory of Literary Production**. 1978. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, especially pp. 20-40.
 33. Bennett, p. 71; and see Roman Jakobson's "Linguistics and Poetics" in **Style in Language**, ed. T. Sebeok (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), pp. 350-377.
 34. Bennett, p. 74.
 35. Selden, **Contemporary Literary theory**, p. 51.
 36. Bennett, p. 175.

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